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1. Overview 
Although no two conflicts are alike, many have comparable areas of dispute and it is therefore 
possible for lessons learned to be discussed in relevant examples. This review looks at lessons 
learned from local governance initiatives and experiences in other fragile and conflict-affected 
states. While incorporating lessons learned in other countries might be helpful, it is important not 
to assume that all of those lessons are necessarily applicable to other conflict situations. A key 
piece of literature related to these learnt lessons is from a recently developed UNDP How-To 
Guide on Local Governance in Fragile and Conflict-affected Settings: Building a Resilient 
Foundation for Peace and Development (Garrigue, 2016).  
Local governance is an open, evolving and multi-dimensional system, involving formal and 
informal stakeholders of different institutional nature and legitimacies (Garrigue, 2016: 3). Given 
the complexity of local governance in conflict-affected contexts, the uniqueness of different 
conflict-affected contexts, and the time constraint of 5 working days, this review only gives a brief 
overview of lessons learnt and is not exhaustive. Nor is it able to provide recommendations for 
interventions. Where possible examples have been taken from conflict-affected contexts 
including the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Syria and Yemen. However, 
some lessons learnt are more general where the literature indicates that these are relevant to 
fragile and conflict-affected states but explicit examples from conflict-affected states have not 
been found. Two further in-depth examples with lessons learned from Somalia and Syria are 
discussed in the final section. Literature argues against using a ‘best practice’ approach to local 
governance, and instead a ‘best-fit’ approach is suggested, whereby initiatives ‘work with the 
grain’, building on what is already there and works in a local context, and a shift towards local 
problem-solving (Booth, 2011; Garrigue, 2016; Grandvoinnet et al, 2015). 
Other lessons learned include: 
 Important to pay attention to context, timescales and trade-offs. 
 Context at the local level is particularly key for effective local governance interventions. 
Local and regional specificities need to be understood, as well as the political economy of 
central-local relations. 
 Local governance approaches should be flexible, and can be designed at different states 
of a conflict continuum.  
 Transforming local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings is a long-term 
undertaking and programmes sometimes need to readjust what they consider ‘success’ 
to look like. 
 Programming can be too localised or on the other hand too centralised. 
 Policy choices on the shape of local governance systems in fragile settings are often 
reduced to a simplistic dichotomy: new or old. Focus on resilience-strengthening instead. 
 Informal or traditional power-holders in fragile states, such as tribal and religious leaders 
– or by business interests or elite groups are important to consider. These informal 
power-holders may act either as ‘blockers’ or ‘enablers’ to change. 
 Lack of coordination between various local governing structures on the ground can 
impact effectiveness. 
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 The presence or absence of humanitarian aid represents a largely unrecognised factor in 
the prospects for post-conflict state building (including local governance) in intra-war 
settings. 
 Investing time and resources in trust-building is paramount. 
 Paying attention to the marginalised (e.g. women, youth) energises grassroots 
participation. 
 Providing funding to local governments from day one to promote comprehensive 
development of local institutions. 
Rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of local governance interventions in conflict-affected 
settings is limited. Lessons learned in guidance and grey literature are often reiterated in different 
sources, however, explicit examples from conflict-affected settings are not always available. 
Literature searches were concentrated on specific countries that had similarities to South Sudan 
at the request of the DFID advisers (e.g. DRC, Somalia, Syria and Central African Republic). The 
coverage, quantity and quality of the literature varied greatly for each state (e.g. no relevant 
recent literature was found on local governance in the Central African Republic in the review 
timeframe). The impacts of local governance interventions and lessons learned are also not 
always evident in the literature. One reason for this paucity of evidence relates to the difficulty in 
measuring the long-term impact of activities on institutions.  
Gender issues were considered in some of the literature, especially as it is recognised that 
women’s participation in local governance and peace negotiations plays a crucial role in the 
termination of conflict. Disability was also considered during the literature review but was not 
reflected in any of the literature found. 
2. Establishing local governance in conflict-affected 
contexts 
Many researchers argue that the success or failure in establishing local governance can be 
measured according to three dimensions: Effectiveness, Security and Legitimacy (see Khalaf, 
2015). Effectiveness means regular and equitable provision of basic needs such as electricity, 
water, food, jobs, etc. Security involves securing the lives of civilians in a systematic rather than 
ad-hoc manner through the creation, maintenance and management of the police, judicial system 
and armed services. Legitimacy refers to a complex set of beliefs, values and institutions 
(endogenous and exogenous) about the social compact governing state-society relations. In 
conflict, legitimacy is related to the provision of basic services and security measures in a 
manner accountable to local citizens (Khalaf, 2015: 41-42).  
Service delivery 
Improving the local delivery of basic services has been seen as a vital entry point for reforming 
local governance in fragile states. Services can improve the livelihoods of poor populations and 
thereby boost the legitimacy of the state and of local-government institutions. Service delivery 
can also be an entry point for the capacity-building of local service-providers and triggers local 
democratic action by mobilising citizens around demands for services and participation in 
planning processes (Kyed & Engberg-Pedersen, 2008: 3).  
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The primary strategy for addressing fragility has therefore focused on strengthening the capacity 
of state institutions to deliver services (Grandvoinnet et al, 2015: 194). However, it has recently 
been recognised that not only the effectiveness of state institutions but also other dynamics in 
societies contribute to fragility. This literature also suggests that state legitimacy needs to be 
understood in a broader context of state-society relationships (see Elgin-Cossart, Jones and 
Esberg, 2012 in Grandvoinnet et al, 2015: 194), with the ability of a state to provide services is 
only one factor affecting its legitimacy.  
Security 
Morrissey (2016) argues that it is important to recognise the protection/governance cross over 
and the potential for positive (individual, collective and structural) change through addressing 
both. The Within and Without the State (WWS) programme1 run by Oxfam in Équateur state in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) found that protection and governance are closely 
intertwined in the DRC (Morrissey, 2016: 4). The programme has established community 
protection committees with an equal number of male and female representatives. Recognising 
the importance of creating a safe space for women within the community for dialogue between 
citizens and those in power, Oxfam also created separate women’s forums as part of the local 
structures (Oxfam, 2016: 7, 12). The inclusion of local minorities (especially women) in peace 
negotiations is argued to play a crucial role in the termination of conflict (Leonardsson & Gustav 
Rudd, 2015: 832).  
Legitimacy 
Political legitimacy refers to whether people who make decisions at the national, state, or local 
level are seen as legitimately representing the interests of citizens (Grandvoinnet et al, 2015: 
195). Fragile and conflict-affected situations are marked by a breakdown in trust and social 
cohesion, which can inflame tensions and perpetuate violence. Relationships within society must 
be restored before social and institutional relationships can be re-established and trust restored 
(Grandvoinnet et al, 2015: 196). Addressing issues of trust, legitimacy, and justice through social 
accountability sometimes takes precedence over issues of service delivery in fragile and conflict-
affected states, as state building becomes a more difficult undertaking unless there is some 
notion of a social contract to provide the basis for state-society interaction (Grandvoinnet et al, 
2015: 212).  
There are differing ideas between donors on whose capacity to support, i.e. local government, 
local communities or civil society. Despite these differences, critics of local capacity approaches 
also argue that such approaches often assume a non-state and traditional local that is inherently 
authentic and legitimate, thus circumventing the need to critically assess who this local 
represents (Leonardsson & Gustav Rudd, 2015: 830). Leonardsson & Gustav Rudd (2015: 831) 
argue that the need to leave space for local peace initiatives is an important component of the 
emancipatory approaches to peacebuilding, which derive from the notion of local agency as 
crucial in peacebuilding and governance. 
                                                   
1 A five-year global initiative (2011–2016) funded by the Department for International Development’s Conflict, 
Humanitarian and Security Department. See https://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/our-work/governance-
citizenship/within-and-without-the-state  
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From ‘best practice’ to ‘best-fit’ 
Booth (2011: 1) argues against the ‘universal best practice’ approach to governance, arguing that 
there are no institutional templates that are valid everywhere and for all stages in a country’s 
development, and instead suggests a ‘best fit’ approach. According to the Africa Power and 
Politics Programme (APPP) research, Booth (2011: 1) writes that best-fit approaches imply a real 
commitment to ‘working with the grain’, meaning building on what already works such as existing 
institutional arrangements that have recognisable benefits, and a shift from direct support to 
facilitating local problem-solving. An implication of this best-fit model is that external actors base 
their decisions and their policy dialogue on a thorough understanding of the prevailing 
institutional arrangements (Booth, 2011: 3). Booth argues that in most cases, institutional 
arrangements that work are ‘practical hybrids’ that combine modern professional standards with 
elements of local society. 
Garrigue (2016: 24) also supports ‘best-fit’, highlighting that the main principles for transforming 
institutions are: to help local institutions focus on immediate priorities of men and women for 
services and guide them away from trying to tackle everything at once; and to pursue ‘best-fit’ 
changes (rather than mechanistic ‘best’ practices) in the way local institutions function, allowing 
flexibility and innovation and avoiding overly normative frameworks. He also highlights the 
importance of feedback from piloted experiences to shape reforms of local governance 
arrangements. 
Through interviews with World Bank staff working on social accountability programmes in fragile 
and conflict-affected states, Grandvoinnet et al (2015: 216) also found that social accountability 
approaches based on organic structures and initiated by local stakeholders themselves tended to 
be the most successful and judged by World Bank staff to be the most legitimate. World Bank 
staff also reflected that wherever feasible, programmes should build on existing government and 
traditional institutions. 
3. Lessons learned in local governance  
Many of the following lessons learned are taken from the UNDP How-To Guide on Local 
Governance in Fragile and Conflict-affected Settings: Building a Resilient Foundation for Peace 
and Development (Garrigue, 2016)2, as well as from contexts such as Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Syria and Yemen. The Guide draws upon the extensive experience 
of UNDP and the United Nations system in working with local governance institutions in fragile 
and conflict-affected settings, and was developed through insights and guidance from UNDP 
staff and experts in Country Offices and in Headquarters. 
Context is key 
Context at the local level is key for effective local governance interventions. Local and regional 
specificities need to be understood, as well as the political economy of central-local relations 
(Garrigue, 2016: 15). Grandvoinnet et al (2015: 213) also underline the importance of investing in 
                                                   
2 The Guide proposes a holistic Framework for Action and as part of the guide, UNDP has created a Diagnostic 
Tool on Local Governance in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings to help with analysis and understanding of the 
local political and development contexts to support programme design (Garrigue, 2016: xv). 
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understanding the local context of fragile states, both in the design phase of a programme and 
throughout implementation, adjusting accordingly. Context can change quickly in these states, 
hence, programmes need to be adaptive and readjusted to fit complex situations. A regionally 
differentiated approach may be necessary: urban areas in particular require a different approach 
to more dispersed rural populations (World Bank, 2017). The use of local facilitators to help 
understand the local context and ensuring that the programme approaches are rooted in the 
social norms of the community can also be important (Grandvoinnet et al, 2015: 216).  
Case study: Hybrid governance in Syria 
Khalaf (2016) argues that Syria is without functioning government in many areas but not without 
governance. Khalaf (2015: 65) argues that a ‘Hybrid Governance’ is being formed in Syria as 
state-building and civil society forces seek to reconstruct and/or reform governance with and 
without formal governance structures. She hence argues that international interventions will not 
be able to positively redress this fragility unless they understand governance on the ground in 
Syria, from a local perspective (Khalaf, 2015: 66). Khalaf’s (2015: 66) assessment of case 
studies from across Syria illustrate that both economic and human resources are critical for 
improved governance, but so is agency and social relationships on the ground.  
Case study: community-driven reconstruction in Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Community-driven reconstruction (CDR) has become a new paradigm in post-conflict 
development, it combines infrastructure restoration with introducing good governance at the local 
level. Recent evaluations show that governance objectives are not easily met and significant 
change cannot be demonstrated through CDR. Kyamusugulwa et al (2014: 813) add to this 
argument on the basis of ethnographic research on a CDR programme in eastern DRC, finding 
that the impact of the programme was in the realisation of projects, rather than in affecting local 
governance. This is the result of factors including the working of power relations on the ground 
and the mismatch between the project initiatives and the locally prevailing norms, institutions and 
existing accountability mechanisms. Not having experienced this type of governance before, 
people had no expectations relating to the governance objectives of the programme. 
Kyamusugulwa et al (2014: 813) identify room for improvement by better adjusting capacity 
building to locally prevailing accountability mechanisms and by coordinating capacity building 
with other development programmes. They concluded that governance practices may be 
enhanced beyond these CDR programmes when: the existing community dynamics are taken 
into account, including the prevailing accountability norms and practices; when the training 
content is consistent and adjusted to local realities; when incentives are built in to promote 
accountable project delivery in practice; and when coordination is undertaken with other actors 
promoting governance in the same area (Kyamusugulwa et al, 2014: 825). 
Flexibility in design is critical 
Flexibility in local governance programme design is critical. A local governance programme can 
be designed at different states of a conflict continuum (see Garrigue, 2016: 49-50 for more 
information). However, different conflict stages can coexist in a single country (e.g. Eastern 
versus Western DRC, Somaliland versus Somalia) and each will require a specific programme 
strategy. Programmes may also straddle different conflict stages over the years (Garrigue, 2016: 
49). Flexibility and adaptation to changing political and security circumstances is also necessary. 
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Timely and long-term support is needed 
Local governance needs long-haul support to achieve change at scale. Donor support often 
comes too late in post-conflict situations and stops too early (e.g. tied to the completion of local 
elections) (Garrigue, 2016: 15). Transforming local governance in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings is a long-term undertaking. Timelines for institutional change are highly contextual, 
however, evidence shows that governance reforms do not usually produce quick results, and a 
more measured long-term ambition on a 10-15/15-20 year timeline is more realistic (Garrigue, 
2016: 17; World Bank, 2011: 11).  
Provide comprehensive multi-layered support 
Building linkages between local and national governance early on in post-conflict situations, 
including by rebuilding intermediary levels of government, ensuring communication capacities 
and enabling resource flows, is key to rebuilding the viability of the state (United Nations/World 
Bank, 2017: 7). Programming can be too localised, focusing on the community level, or on the 
other hand too centralised, focusing mostly on policy aspects (Garrigue, 2016: 15). 
Comprehensive multi-layered support to the various levels of sub-national governance is rarely 
seen; instead the concept that these levels of local governance need to be built one after the 
other sequentially is commonly applied, which is not always effective (Garrigue, 2016: 15).  
Consider the diversity of functions of local government 
Donors tend to focus on the service-delivery function of local governance institutions in a conflict 
or post-conflict situation. Yet, expectations from local populations on what their local 
governments should do may be different. The complex set of functions of local governance 
systems needs to be built into more holistic change strategies (Garrigue, 2016: 15).  
Focus on function over form 
The United Nations/World Bank (2017: 7) highlights that the resumption of minimal levels of 
service delivery and the facilitation of participation in decision-making where possible is critically 
relevant in creating or re-instating formal institutional arrangements or agreeing to best-practice 
options for the future sub-national institutional arrangements of the state. This may mean making 
use of community decision making rather than formal subnational government decision making. 
The United Nations/World Bank (2017: 7) also emphasises the building and strengthening of 
what institutional and social accountability mechanisms already exist (even if local elections may 
not be feasible in the immediate post-conflict situation), especially with regard to revenue and 
expenditures of local governments. In the absence of agreed laws, these may be informal.  
Case study: local systems of governance in South Kivu, DRC 
For more than 15 years, the DRC’s South Kivu province in the East of the country has 
experienced recurrent war and violence. But while the state collapsed during this time, 
governance did not entirely disappear. Mushi’s (2013: 31-34) article examined how and why local 
systems of governance and networking survived in South Kivu during the civil war, and draws 
lessons from unstructured interviews with people in local governance. Multi-layered, networked 
governance exists in the absence of a state, and needs to be harnessed in post-conflict 
reconstruction, not viewed as a threat to it. In DRC, churches have emerged as one of the most 
accessible and durable channels of outside assistance to local communities. Mushi (2012) found 
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that the social contract between the state and society has largely been re-established in the 
DRC, partly due to the powerful negative lesson of what the alternative represents. However 
sources of tension remain.  
Reconsider what ‘success’ looks like 
Lessons learned from the WWS programme in Équateur state in the DRC, highlighted that 
governance work in contexts such as DRC with such endemic fragility takes time and 
programmes sometimes need to readjust what they consider ‘success’ to look like. Since there 
are such limited resources in the government to meet the supply side of meeting citizen’s needs 
and issues of law and order are so complex, success and progress come through the form of 
compromise for a ‘good enough’ solution (Morrissey, 2016: 9). 
Find a balance between modern vs old local governance systems 
Policy choices on the shape of local governance systems in fragile and conflict-affected settings 
are often reduced to a simplistic dichotomy: new or old. The focus on resilience-strengthening 
acknowledges the need to use local solutions and engage with informal actors and processes, 
even if they may be at odds with the democratic paradigm. A risk, however, is that too much 
focus on ‘resilience’ justifies maintaining problematic socio-political orders in place (Garrigue, 
2016: 15). 
Case Study: decentralisation in DRC 
Gaynor (2016), through documentary and field work in Kinshasa and Bas-Congo, highlights three 
principle sets of challenges to the decentralisation process in DRC – resistance from central 
authorities; weaknesses in the relevant legislation; and a lack of responsiveness to local priorities 
at provincial level. She argues that these challenges are due to decentralisation being rooted in 
the post-war elite political settlement of the early 2000s which privileged regional stability over 
political transformation, strengthening the power of former rebels and combatants at both 
national and provincial levels thereby increasing the vulnerability and marginalisation of the 
population (Gaynor, 2016: 210). Consequently, decentralisation in the DRC is limited to territorial 
reform and therefore differs fundamentally from the more politically transformative forms 
reviewed in the literature and pursued in neighbouring states. She recommends thinking beyond 
elections as a means toward political transformation to more regularised fora of debate and 
exchange between citizens and their local authorities; moving beyond the political settlement and 
building and supporting deeper and more inclusive governance mechanisms (Gaynor, 2016: 
210).  
Understand informal power dynamics  
Oxfam’s WWS programme produced guidelines in 2013 developed from experience gathered 
through the programme’s first two years of practice. The guidelines highlight the significance of 
informal or traditional power-holders in fragile states, such as tribal and religious leaders – or by 
business interests or elite groups (Fooks, 2013: 5). These informal power-holders may act either 
as ‘blockers’ or ‘enablers’, preventing change which they do not see as desirable, or being able 
to influence formal power-holders in the state to achieve change. Strengthening governance may 
also involve working to improve the accountability and transparency of these informal power-
holders, and ensuring they exercise their own power in the interests of citizens and communities 
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(Fooks, 2013: 5). A further lesson learnt from the WWS programme was that working with Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs) was an appropriate entry point into fragile states, however noting 
that this is not sufficient to promote good governance (Fooks, 2013: 3). 
Case study: tribal traditions in Yemen 
Al-Dawsari (2012) highlighted the important role tribal law and traditions could play in the 
Republic of Yemen in restoring a degree of stability, as the new government struggled to 
establish legitimacy and address its most pressing issues during the transition period after the 
signing of a power-sharing deal in 2011. He argued that Yemenis have relied on indigenous tribal 
traditions to regulate conflict and establish justice for centuries. He acknowledged that 
engagement with the tribes and the traditional system might involve some risk and a lack of 
understanding of local power dynamics and the political landscape could create or exacerbate 
existing conflicts (Al-Dawsari, 2012: 14). He argued that tribal mechanisms for conflict resolution 
needed to be integrated with the formal system so that they work alongside and complement 
formal institutions, and that issues related to the stresses that the tribal system were facing must 
be addressed within that framework (Al-Dawsari, 2012: 2).  
In the Republic of Yemen, one of the main factors behind the push for local governance is the 
desire to enhance engagement with citizens, bolster the legitimacy of the state, and strengthen 
its authority (Grandvoinnet et al, 2015: 259). The World Bank undertook a contextual review of 
social accountability approaches for six regions in Yemen more recently. It found that ‘the future 
of political and economic development in the Republic of Yemen depends to a large extent on 
the tribe-state relationship. Historical legacies have made this relationship increasingly complex. 
Tribal leaders who have been co-opted by the state have lost legitimacy in the eyes of their 
tribesmen. Even so, the absence of state institutions has forced citizens to refer to these leaders 
and tribal networks. Given the impact that tribal leaders and institutions have on society, they 
have to be factored into any governance reforms (Grandvoinnet et al, 2015: 271).  
Case study: clan elders and traditional authorities in Somaliland 
Kyed & Engberg-Pedersen (2008: 3) highlight the role clan elders and traditional authorities have 
played in local affairs in Somalia. Although having contributed to conflicts, violence and abuses 
of human rights, customary courts of elders also cater for the resolution of a large majority of 
reported crimes. The complex reality and extensive powers of elders have been addressed by 
certain donors, including the Danish Refugee Council in Somaliland, where it has treated 
powerful elders as both targets and agents of change in an attempt to reduce clan conflicts in a 
wider peace and state-building process.  
Reliance on non-state authorities (e.g. traditional authorities, warlords, religious leaders, or clan 
elders) in service delivery and local governance can be effective in reaching marginal 
populations and help boost local legitimacy for reform, but such authorities often operate in ways 
that are at odds with liberal-democratic values. Thus, non-state authorities should be regarded 
not only as ‘agents of change’, but also as ‘targets of change’ (Kyed & Engberg-Pedersen, 2008: 
4). Reliance on non-state providers in service delivery risks creating parallel structures that are 
not aligned with formal state and local-government institutions.  
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Coordination between governance structures is important 
Case study: local councils in Syria 
Since 2012, hundreds of local councils (previously known as Local Coordination Committees) 
have been formed in Syrian cities, towns, and villages where the al-Assad regime has 
relinquished control (Aljundi, 2014: 10). Today more than 400 councils still operate in opposition-
held parts of Syria (Chalhoub, 2017: 2). The councils provide essential public services, including 
water, electricity, and street cleaning, as well as humanitarian relief, transportation, police and 
security. Local councils have different levels of independence and effectiveness due to varying 
circumstances on the ground (Aljundi, 2014: 15). Some local councils often fail to represent their 
communities since they are not elected, they struggle to follow democratic procedures, create 
effective organisations, and delineate decision-making procedures. Councils lack a consistent 
source of funding that would allow them to systemise their work and plans. Some local councils 
also maintain relations with military groups, and some have military units, but often the exact 
nature of the relationship is unclear. Many of the local councils also lack the presence and 
participation of women (Aljundi, 2014: 11). 
Through interviews and work undertaken by the Syria Initiative (SI) with local actors, Chalhoub 
(2017) identifies the lack of coordination between various local governing structures on the 
ground in Syria as a major issue to local governance effectiveness. This finding mainly concerns 
the lack of coordination in opposition-held areas between local councils, civil society 
organisations and quasi-governmental bodies. Khalaf (2015) also discusses this lack of 
coordination, which has resulted in a loose constellation of city-states and villages. As a result, 
local organisational structures have remained a-territorial, failing to create strong bottom-up local 
structures and economies of scale that allow for the geographically dispersed areas to exchange 
services and knowledge. More importantly, the lack of coordination between local bodies has put 
them in a weak position vis-à-vis the armed groups that provide for the security in the respective 
areas (Chalhoub, 2017: 2). 
Recognise the role of aid and competing donor interests 
External support to fragile states may lessen the government’s dependence on tax revenues, 
threatening to remove the most fundamental connection between the state and society 
(Grandvoinnet et al, 2015: 219). Referring to Somaliland, Eubank (2010 in Grandvoinnet et al, 
2015: 219) notes that the lack of outside support provided a compelling reason to accept 
compromise and co-option of opposition groups.  
Case study: donor involvement in Syria 
Meininghaus (2016: 1454) argues that, in the case of intra-state war, the presence or absence of 
humanitarian aid represents a largely unrecognised factor in the prospects for post-conflict state 
building. She draws on the example of the Syrian war, where she suggests humanitarian aid has 
become deeply politicised. Meininghaus (2016: 1457) argues that, among the wider population, 
the uneven distribution of aid between government- and opposition-held areas influences 
population movements and shapes local governance processes. Meininghaus (2016: 1468) 
discusses how Syria is witnessing the emergence of manifold hybrid systems of humanitarian 
and political governance which do not run parallel but have become conflated. In the paper, she 
highlighted the way that humanitarian aid provides resources, builds service infrastructures and 
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influences local governance processes, which, beyond the warring parties, decisively shape the 
everyday realities and power relations on the ground for the local population at large 
(Meininghaus, 2016: 1468). 
Chalhoub (2017: 2) argues that competing donor interests have also contributed to scattering 
local governance structures in opposition-held areas in Syria. By failing to synchronise 
guidelines, budgets and capacity-building programmes offered to local CSOs and local councils, 
donors have contributed to the de-facto isolation of local actors. Chalhoub (2017) further argues 
that the competition among donors has hence segregated local actors and reduced them to total 
dependency on external aid. These policies have also weakened the collective impact that local 
governing bodies could have on building credible political structures that can speak in the name 
of local communities in Syria. 
4. Further case studies  
Case study: external support - UNDP Joint Programme on Local 
Governance in Somalia  
Local governance systems in the three main areas of Somalia are diverse. In the South Central 
region, emerging self-government administrations that have been increasingly providing basic 
services and security face resistance from the new Transitional Federal Government that favours 
a more centralised state. Somaliland, a self-declared independent state, has adopted a unique 
system of local governance integrating modern and clan-based structures. It has had great 
success in maintaining stability, but still lacks considerable capacity to improve local 
development planning and deliver universal access to services. In Puntland, an autonomous 
state in the Somali federation, the rule of law is weak and this is reflected in an incomplete local 
government structure (no elected councils, outdated legislation) with basic capacities for 
administration and service delivery (Garrigue, 2016: 59). 
With the main objective of increasing the delivery of basic services to rural populations living in 
extreme poverty, and moving away from a humanitarian assistance model that was prevailing at 
that time in Somalia, UNDP and four other UN entities launched the Joint Programme on Local 
Governance in 2008. This programme was designed to support the establishment of district-level 
autonomous and accountable local governments and the development of effective linkages with 
constituent communities and the private sector (Garrigue, 2016: 59). 
The following lessons learned from the UNDP Joint Programme in Somalia are taken from 
Garrigue (2016: 59): 
 A bottom-up approach to building subnational institutions is relevant, even in the most 
adverse environments. 
 Investing time and resources in trust-building is paramount in contexts where local 
governance stakeholders have grown very suspicious of each other and of central 
government institutions. 
 Paying attention to the marginalised (women, youth) energises grassroots participation in 
the programme. 
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 The rigidity of programme documents need to be sacrificed for practical realities and 
increased local ownership; but a clear assignation of roles to programmes partners in 
such a complex conflict environment is essential. 
 Providing funding to local governments from day one, even in high risk environments 
such as Somalia, including by such creative solutions as tapping into local and diaspora 
resources, is the only way to promote comprehensive development of local institutions. It 
also creates a sense of shared responsibility at the core of renewing state-society 
relations. 
Case study: locally developed - Kurdish self-governance in Syria 
Sary (2016) discusses Kurdish self-governance in Syria. Syria’s Kurds have emerged at the 
forefront of the battle with self-styled Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), gaining them support 
from the United States even as tensions between them and the Syrian opposition have 
increased. The ascension to power of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) signalled a pragmatic 
approach in which tacit agreements with the regime have been sought in order to obtain greater 
autonomy from the central government.  
In the north-east of Syria, the PYD has announced its intention to establish a federal region of 
Rojava (Khalaf, 2016). The PYD’s local legitimacy, while not uncontested, stems from its success 
in combating ISIS and its ability to deliver a localised form of governance. The PYD now seeks to 
further consolidate its power and to legitimise itself through the provision of security, services and 
public diplomacy (Khalaf, 2016: 2). The model of local administration in Rojava, the PYD-led 
Rojava Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM), has fostered a number of positive 
developments, such as a focus on individual personal freedoms. In addition, it can also be 
argued that its decentralised model may hold at least part of the solution to a lasting settlement in 
Syria.  
However, Sary (2016: 11) argues that TEV-DEM remains insufficient, and at times heavily 
dependent on the central government in Damascus. Sary (2016: 2) highlights that TEV-DEM 
should be mindful of the dangers associated with overreach and recommends that it should focus 
on strengthening the local administration in areas it already controls rather than continuing to 
expand into areas of Sunni Arab majority. Such expansion threatens to sow the seeds of ethnic 
conflict and place unmanageable burdens on TEV-DEM capacities and resources. Khalaf (2016: 
2) also highlights that the PYD has less support in areas further from combat zones, with locals 
citing its brutality and authoritarianism. The PYD continues to suppress critical civil society voices 
and political opposition. 
Khalaf (2016: 2) discusses how the PYD is an effective provider of services, a function it also 
instrumentalises as a means of consolidating its power. Service provision varies across Rojava: 
in areas where the PYD co-exists with regime authorities, a myriad of institutions have 
developed, sometimes creating parallel structures. Meanwhile, in areas where the PYD enjoys 
greater control, power remains centralised, despite the PYD’s claims to decentralise power to the 
local level. In Arab-majority areas such as Manbij, locals report that the PYD ensures that only 
representatives that are loyal to it are able to govern, undermining the legitimacy of the new 
structures in the eyes of the local community.  
Khalaf (2016: 2) highlights how Rojava’s leaders continue to walk a tightrope between 
international and regional interests. As the chances for legitimacy in the form of political 
endorsement are slim, locally-derived legitimacy is of great import. At the local level, legitimacy 
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means more than just the provision of services, security and public diplomacy image 
management. Legitimacy here implies a non-authoritarian approach that enjoys social and 
political trust in the Rojava project from the different components of society. It involves practising 
a social contract based on real participation and representation from these societal components 
and non-coerced acceptance of the Democratic Autonomous Administration3 institutions (Khalaf, 
2016: 24). 
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